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THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT
CONFRONTS THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT IN ITS
INTERPRETATION OF THE RAPE
VICTIM SHIELD STATUTE
State v. Jones'
Nearly every jurisdiction in the United States has enacted a rape victim
shield statute. 2 One state has reached the same result through judicial deci-
sion. 3 Although the substance of these shield laws varies somewhat among
1. 716 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
2. FED. R. Evi). 412; ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1986); ALAsKA STAT. § 12.45.045
(Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1810.1-.4 (1977); CAL. EVm. CODE § 1103 (West
Supp. 1987); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-3-407 (1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f
(West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3508-3509 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022
(West Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-202.1 (Harrison Supp. 1986); HAw. REv.
STAT. tit. 33, ch. 626, § 412 (1986); IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 115.7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Burns
1985); IowA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (Supp.
1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.145 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 15.498 (West 1981); ME. R. Evm. 412; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A
(1982); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21B (West 1986); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §
28.788(10) (Callaghan 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West Supp. 1987); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-68-70 (Supp. 1986); Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.015 (Supp. 1987); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(4)-(5) (1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-321 (1985); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 48.069 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A-6 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A-84A-32.1 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16 (1984); N.Y. CIk.
PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 R.412 (1986); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-15 (1985); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1907.02(D) (Baldwin Supp.
1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (West Supp. 1979-80); OR. REv. STAT. §
40.210 R. 412 (1985); Pa. Cons. Stat. ANN. tit. 18, § 3104 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 11-37-13 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 23A-22-15 (1979); TENN. CODE Am. § 40-17-119 (1982);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.065 (Vernon Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
3255 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2.67.7 (1982); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.020 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-11 (Michie Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 972.11 (West 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1983).
3. State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976)
(en banc).
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jurisdictions, 4 the basic policies behind them remain the same. The purpose
of these laws is to restrict the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct
of rape complainants in order (1) to encourage rape victims to report the
crime, (2) to reverse a long-enduring policy of admitting evidence of highly
questionable relevancy to impeach rape complainants, and (3) to end the
defense practice of "putting the victim on trial" in rape prosecutions. 5 Plac-
ing such a restriction on a criminal defendant's ability to cross-examine a
witness against him raises constitutional issues. Specifically, are rape shield
4. The most restrictive statutes declare any previous sexual conduct by the
victim to be inadmissible unless it is conduct involving the defendant and consent is
at issue in the case. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(4)-(5) (1985). Other statutes
state a basic rule of relevance. If, at an in camera hearing, the proposed evidence is
found to be relevant to a material fact at issue in the case, and its probative value
is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, the judge may rule it ad-
missible and define the limits of examination regarding the issue. E.g., IDAHO CODE
§ 18-6105 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16 (1984); see also S.D. CODIUMD LAws
ANN. § 23A-22-15.1 (1979) ("the testimony of the complaining witness in a trial for
a charge of rape shall not, merely because of the nature of that charge, be treated
in any different manner than the testimony of a complaining witness in any other
criminal case"). Many jurisdictions, including Missouri, follow the approach of stat-
ing a general rule of inadmissibility or presumption of irrelevance, and then listing
specific exceptions to the general rule. The exceptions vary among jurisdictions. E.g.,
COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-407 (1986) (admissible to show alternative source of semen,
pregnancy, or disease); N.Y. CraM. PROc. LAw § 60.42 (McKinney 1981) (any pros-
titution conviction within three years of the rape is admissible); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (allowing specific acts of adultery to impeach). But
cf. Op. Att'y. Gen. S.C., No. 77-328 (1977) (provision may violate equal protection
clause unless adulterers are more likely than other persons with a sexual history to
have consented). For a helpful, although slightly dated, comparison of the laws in
forty-six jurisdictions, see Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the
Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544 (1980).
5. The Missouri Supreme Court described the policy issues in the following
manner:
The thinking behind the enactment of said section undoubtedly was three-
fold. First, it redressed the faulty premise upon which evidence of prior
sexual conduct traditionally had been admitted. Second, it is apparent that
in most instances a rape victim's past conduct has no reasonable bearing
upon the issue of consent or credibility. Introduction of such evidence serves
only to humiliate and embarrass the witness in a public "fishing expedition"
which puts the complainant on trial instead of the appellant. Section 491.015,
thus, reflects a major public policy decision that "victims" not be subjected
to unwarranted psychological and emotional abuse. Lastly, the statute dem-
onstrates a reasonable and proper attempt to aid effective law enforcement
by encouraging victims of rape to report and prosecute such crimes without
a threat to expose intimate details of past sexual activity, if any, to the
public.
State v. Brown, 636 S.W.2d 929, 933 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1212 (1983) (citation omitted).
[Vol. 52
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laws generally violative of the sixth amendment 6 right to confront and cross-
examine one's accusers? If rape shield laws are not per se unconstitutional,
are they ever so restrictive as to go beyond constitutional limitations on the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses?
This Note will discuss State v. Jones,7 and examine whether the Missouri
Supreme Court's interpretation of the law in that case serves the policies
behind the Missouri Rape Victim Shield Statute' without violating the de-
fendant's consitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.9 For pur-
poses of comparison and analysis, the court's previous interpretation of the
law in State v. Brown0 will be examined. The primary focus will be upon
the effect of the changes in the law as a result of the holding in Jones.
The defendant, James Jones, was accused of rape and sodomy by a
woman with whom he was acquainted. According to his version of the events,
he was at a party across the street from the complainant's house. After
Jones' wife went home, Jones went outside, saw the complainant, and en-
gaged in a conversation with her. She asked him "why he had not paid
attention to her lately," and he replied that "he was married now. '"' Jones
and the complainant then went into her house where he claimed that she
seduced him.
12
The complainant, on the other hand, claimed that Jones entered her
bedroom while she was sleeping, "grabbed her around the neck, pulled her
out of bed, displayed a gun, and threatened to kill her and her children if
she did not submit to him."' 3 She submitted to intercourse with the defen-
6. The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution states in part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him. .. ."
Section 18(a), article I, of the Missouri Constitution similarly provides: "That
in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses
against him face to face ... ." It appears that Missouri courts interpret section 18(a)
coextensively with the sixth amendment rather than giving it a broader interpretation.
See, e.g., Sullivan v. State, 617 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Gray, 616
S.W.2d 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see also State v. Hicks, 591 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1979) (while the confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions
are similar, the standards of the federal court decisions interpreting the sixth amend-
ment must be met when determining the admissibility of hearsay testimony). Any
discussion in this Note of the sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, will, therefore, apply equally to Mo. CONST. art.
I, § 18(a).
7. 716 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
8. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.015 (Supp. 1987).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(a).
10. 636 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1212 (1983).
11. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 803 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
12. Id. (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 801.
1987]
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dant, engaged in a half-hour conversation with him, and again submitted to
intercourse. 4
Jones sought an in camera hearing in accordance with the rape shield
statute" in order to propose an offer of evidence regarding consensual sexual
relations he had with the complainant three-and-one-half to four-and-one-
half months before the alleged rape. 16 Jones' theory was that the complainant
had a motive to falsify rape charges after consensual intercourse because she
was angry that the defendant had married and was jealous of his wife. 7
There was evidence that the complainant and Jones' wife "were on very bad
terms."' 8 Jones' sister testified that the complainant had asked her "why
14. Id. at 803 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
15. Section 491.015 of the Missouri statutes provides:
I. In prosecutions under chapter 566, RSMO [sexual offenses] or prose-
cutions related to sexual conduct under chapter 568, RSMO [offenses against
the family], opinion and reputation evidence of the complaining witness'
prior sexual conduct or the absence of such instances or conduct is inad-
missible, except where such specific instances are:
(1) Evidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining witness with the
defendant to prove consent where consent is a defense to the alleged crime
and the evidence is reasonably contemporaneous with the date of the alleged
crime; or
(2) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing alternative source
or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease;
(3) Evidence of immediate surrounding circumstances of the alleged crime;
or
(4) Evidence relating to the previous chastity of the complaining witness in
cases, where, by statute, previously chaste character is required to be proved
by the prosecution.
2. Evidence of the sexual conduct of the complaining witness offered under
this section is admissible to the extent that the court finds the evidence
relevant to a material fact or issue.
3. If the defendant proposes to offer evidence of the sexual conduct of the
complaining witness under this section, he shall file with the court a written
motion accompanied by an offer of proof or make an offer of proof on
the record outside the hearing of the jury. The court shall hold an in camera
hearing to determine the sufficiency of the offer of proof .... If the court
finds apy of the evidence offered admissible under this section the court
shall make an order stating the scope of the evidence which may be intro-
duced. Objections to any decision of the court under this section may be
made by either the prosecution or the defendant in the manner provided by
law. The in camera hearing shall be recorded and the court shall set forth
its reasons for its ruling. The record of the in camera hearing shall be sealed
for delivery to the parties and to the appellate court in the event of an appeal
or other post trial proceeding.
Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 491.015 (Supp. 1987).
16. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 800.
17. Id. at 804 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
18. Id. (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 52
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James had gotten involved with Yolanda [Jones' wife]."' 19 She also testified
that the complainant "just told me that if it took all her life she was gone
[sic] get James back." 2 The above testimony, along with testimony by an
emergency room physician regarding the presence of a cervical tear and
redness and bruising on the complainant's neck on the night of the rape2'
constituted all the available evidence. The trial court denied Jones' offer of
proof.22 Consequently, in what was characterized as a "swearing match" by
the dissent,23 the complainant's version of events was the only one fully put
before the jury. Jones was convicted of rape and sodomy, 2 and the Missouri
Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.? On appeal to the Missouri Su-
preme Court, Jones argued that his proposed offer of proof was erroneously
excluded by the trial court and that his conviction should therefore be re-
versed.26 Jones relied upon subsection 1(1) of the rape shield law, arguing
that the alleged consensual intercourse with the complainant was "'reasonably
contemporaneous with the date of the alleged crime." 27 He also relied upon
subsection 2 of the law, arguing that the proposed evidence was independently
admissible in that it was "relevant to a material fact or issue" in the case.?
The majority of the court, in an opinion written by Judge Donnelly, disagreed
with Jones and affirmed his conviction.29
In holding that the evidence was not admissible under subsection 2 of
the rape shield statute, the court overruled its previous holding in State v.
Brown.30 In Brown, the court had interpreted subsection 2 of the rape shield
statute as a "catch-all" category:
Nevertheless, when read objectively it is clear that the challenged statute
creates only a "presumption" that evidence of a victim's prior sexual con-
duct is irrelevant. Enumerated exceptions to the general presumption, as
listed in § 491.015(l)-(5), retain the principle that in limited circumstances
prior sexual conduct may be relevant. Further, the "catch-all" in subsection
2 of § 491.015 allows introduction of any evidence "the court finds ...
relevant to a material fact or issue" (quoting subsection 2 of the rape shield
statute). Consistent therewith is the fact that no one suggests that due process
requires the admission of irrelevant evidence. Reference [sic] the exercise of
that duty by the trial court, some discretion must be allowed to forbid the
19. Id. (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
20. Id. (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 801.
22. Id. at 800.
23. Id. at 803 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 800.
25. State v. Jones, No. 47227 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 1984).
26. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 800.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 802.
30. 636 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1212 (1983).
1987]
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admissibility of evidence which is found to have its probative value, if any,
outweighed by its potential for prejudicial impact.'
The Brown court indicated that its reading of the statute as creating only a
presumption of irrelevance was necessary in order for it to survive consti-
tutional challenge: "In this light, the challenged statute suffers no consti-
tutional infirmity and is not violative of any rights of confrontation and is,
in our opinion, facially constitutional. ' 32
The Jones majority overruled the Brown holdings by stating:
On reexamination, we believe such statement of law is erroneous. Section
491.015 provides that evidence of specific instances of a victim's prior sexual
conduct is inadmissible except as provided in (1), (2), (3) and (4). In our
view, Subsection 2 is directed only at the exceptions set forth in (1), (2),
(3), and (4). Evidence offered under (1), (2), (3), and (4) is admissible only
"to the extent that the court finds ... [it] relevant to a material fact or
issue" (quoting subsection 2 of the rape shield statute) ... If all "relevant"
evidence were admissible, there would be no reason for (1), (2), (3) and (4).33
After disposing of Jones' argument that the evidence of a prior consensual
sexual relationship was independently admissible under subsection 2 of the
rape shield statute, the court turned to his argument that the evidence was
admissible under subsection 1(1). In holding that evidence of consensual sex
that occurred three-and-one-half to four-and-one-half months before the date
of the alleged rape was not "reasonably contemporaneous with the date of
the alleged crime," 3 4 the Jones majority discussed the cases of State v. Crisp35
and State v. Boyd.16
In Crisp, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, stated in
dicta that consensual sex between the defendant and the victim that occurred
three years before the date of the alleged rape was not "reasonably
contemporaneous" 3 7 within the meaning of the rape shield statute. The ev-
31. Id. at 933-34 (emphasis in original).
32. Id. at 934.
33. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 800. The majority apparently relied upon the rule
that statutes should be construed as a whole. 2A N. SINGER, STATrTs AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 (1984). They reasoned that the reading of subsection 2 as a
"catch-all" category makes no sense when read with the enumerated restrictions.
The legislature may well have intended for the stricter construction to apply.
Since there is no available legislative history, it is not clear what was intended. A
basic presumption of statutory construction, however, is that "the legislature acted
with integrity and with an honest purpose to keep within constitutional limits." Id.
§ 45-11. "As a corollary of the presumption favoring constitutionality, the fact that
one among alternative constructions would involve serious constitutional difficulties
is reason to reject that interpretation in favor of another." Id.
34. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 801.
35. 629 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
36. 643 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
37. Crisp, 629 S.W.2d at 479.
[Vol. 52
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idence, offered to prove consent, was at first excluded by the trial judge,
but the prosecution later impliedly agreed to its introduction for the purpose
of impeaching the complainant's testimony.38 The defendant was convicted
despite admission of the evidence.39 In its discussion of the admissibility of
the prior sexual conduct evidence, the court said:
We doubt if the evidence of Gina's voluntary sexual conduct with the de-
fendant in 1976 in the state of Kansas was "reasonably contemporaneous"
with the sexual intercourse between Gina and Crisp on October 5, 1979.
Reasonably means within the bounds of common sense. Contemporaneous
means originating, or happening, during the same period of time. It is not
common sense to say that events that happened almost three years ago were
reasonably contemporaneous.-
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, further defined the limits
of reasonable contemporaneity in Boyd. The defendant in that case moved
to introduce evidence of previous sexual encounters with the complainant as
relevant to consent.4' At the in camera hearing held to rule on admissibility,
the defendant testified that he and the complainant had consensual sex about
six months before the date of the alleged rape and again about six days
before the date of the alleged rape. 42 The trial court ruled that evidence of
the sexual relations that occurred six months before the alleged rape was
inadmissible because those relations were not "reasonably contemporaneous"
with the alleged rape. 43 The court also ruled, however, that the sexual en-
counter that allegedly occurred six days before the alleged rape was "rea-
sonably contemporaneous" and therefore the evidence was admissible as
relevant to consent.44 The Missouri Court of Appeals agreed with the rea-
soning of the trial court and affirmed on that point.45 After discussing Crisp
and Boyd in a context that indicates approval of the "common sense" limits
set forth in those cases, the Jones majority stated that "judicial review by
the use of clocks or calendars is not enough." The real test is whether, in
light of United States Supreme Court opinions interpreting the right of a
defendant to a fair trial, 47 the defendant was deprived of a fair trial under
38. Id.
39. Id. at 476.
40. Id. at 479.




45. Id. at 830.
46. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 801.
47. See, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (pretrial procedure to
determine whether a confession is voluntary should not have precluded defendant
from inquiring into the matter at trial; exclusion of evidence highly relevant to re-
liability and credibility of confession deprives defendant of fair trial); California v.
19871
7
Evans: Evans: Missouri Supreme Court
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1987
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
the circumstances. 48 In particular, the court cited Chambers v. Mississippi49
for the proposition that while the states have the right to establish their own
rules of evidence and procedure, those rules cannot be applied mechanistically
so as to deprive a defendant of the right to present a complete defense on
his own behalf.50
In finding that Jones was not deprived of a fair trial, the court noted
the testimony of the emergency room doctor regarding the complainant's
injuries the night of the alleged rape.." Apparently, the fact that the doctor's
testimony corroborated the complainant's testimony was enough for the court
to find a fair trial under the circumstances. The court noted, "If this case
involved merely a swearing match between the complaining witness and the
accused on the issue of consent we would be inclined to reverse and remand
for a new trial." '5 2 The redness and bruising were sufficient indication of
force for the court to find that justice had been done.53
The dissenting opinion, written by Judge Blackmar and joined by Judge
Welliver, 54 disagreed with the majority both in the overruling of Brown and
in the holding that exclusion of the proposed evidence was proper under the
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (standard of fundamental fairness in criminal trials
means that the defendant should have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (application of state hearsay
rule combined with voucher rule, which prevented defendant from cross-examining
a witness critical to his defense, denied defendant a fair trial conducted in accord
with due process); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (requirement that
injury be intentionally inflicted in order to be a crime is not a mere whim, it is
necessary for the proper functioning of our legal system).
48. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 801.
49. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
50. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 801.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 801-02.
54. Judge Welliver has apparently never voted to affirm a qonviction based
on the rape shield statute. See, e.g., State v. Ray, 637 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc) (voted to reverse conviction on the grounds that trial court improperly excluded
sexual conduct evidence that was relevant to the issue of consent); State v. Sherman,
637 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (voted to reverse on the ground that evidence
of immediate surrounding circumstances of the alleged crime was improperly excluded
under rape shield statute); State v. Gibson, 636 S.W.2d 956 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)
(voted to reverse on the ground that evidence of complainant's statement to the
accused that she was having sexual problems with her boyfriend was relevant to the
issue of a motive to falsify rape charges and was improperly excluded); State v.
Brown, 636 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1212 (1983)
(dissented on the ground that a sexual relationship between the complainant and her
boyfriend was relevant to the issue of a motive to falsify rape charges, and excluding
the evidence violated the defendant's right to confront witnesses as defined in Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)); State v. Harris, 620 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1981) (en
banc) (dissented on other grounds).
[Vol. 52
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circumstances of the case.5 5 According to the dissent, the overruling of Brown
was unnecessary under the facts of the case and improper because of the
constitutional problem it created:
Brown recognized, however, that there is a serious constitutional problem
if a statute deprives a criminal defendant of the opportunity to introduce
evidence which is relevant and material in his defense .... It is the sense
of Brown that a rape defendant should be able to introduce evidence of
prior sexual conduct of his accuser if the evidence has a reasonable and
proper place in his defense, even though the evidence does not fall within
one of the four exceptions in the first subsection of the statute. The state
and federal constitutions undoubtedly require nothing less. If the evidence
is relevant and material, the defendant is entitled to it even though the
complainant may suffer embarrassment. It is one thing to balance the pro-
bative value and prejudicial effect of evidence against the defendant, but
quite another to balance the value to the defendant and the possible em-
barrassment of a third person.56
The dissent described the case as "a classic example of a swearing match.
' 5 7
Its concern was that there were two basically uncorroborated versions of the
events that took place the night of the alleged rape. While the prosecution
was able to fully present the complainant's version, the defendant was de-
prived of any opportunity to present evidence that may have tended to ex-
onerate him. Under these circumstances, the dissent would have reversed the
conviction and remanded for a new trial, this time admitting the evidence
of the prior sexual relationship as relevant and probative on the issue of
consent.
58
Analysis of the holding in Jones requires an understanding of the dif-
ferent types of sexual conduct evidence and the treatment each type was
traditionally given by the courts before the advent of rape shield laws. There
are three types of sexual conduct evidence, any one of which the accused
may wish to utilize in his defense in a rape prosecution. First, the defendant
may want to impeach the complainant's credibility as a witness by introducing
opinion or reputation evidence of her unchaste character. 9 Second, the de-
55. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 802 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 803 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 802, 804 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
59. E.g., State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 (1883) (female witness in a murder
prosecution may be impeached by reputation evidence of unchastity); State v. White,
35 Mo. 500 (1865) (character of rape prosecutrix may be impeached by reputation
evidence of unchastity).
Although the early decisions tended to link the traits of veracity and general
moral character, e.g., Grant, 79 Mo. 113, the Missouri courts eventually acknowl-
edged the illogic of the reasoning that unchastity was relevant to truthfulness and
began admitting the evidence as relevant to consent. E.g., State v. Ruhr, 533 S.W.2d
656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175 (1935);
State v. Taylor, 320 Mo. 417, 3 S.W.2d 29 (1928).
19871
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fendant may want to introduce evidence of specific instances of sexual activity
between the complainant and a person other than the defendant for im-
peachment purposes6° or as relevant to a material issue in the case such as
a motive to falsify rape charges. 6' Third, the defendant may want to introduce
evidence of specific instances of sexual activity between the complainant and
the defendant as relevant to a material issue in the case, usually consent. 62
Historically, opinion and reputation evidence of prior sexual conduct on
the part of the complaining witness was always admissible to impeach her
credibility. 63 "Unchastity" was considered to be a character flaw indicative
of a woman's propensity to lie as well as indicative of her propensity to
engage in indiscriminate sex, permitting an inference that she consented to
sex with the defendant as well. 64 This view was universally accepted by legal
commentators65 and was implemented in Missouri.6 6
60. E.g., Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 684-86 (8th Cir. 1953)
(overruled by United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 930 (1979)); State v. Wood, 59 Ariz. 48, 122 P.2d 416 (1942) (overruled by
State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976) (en banc));
State v. Patterson, 88 Mo. 88 (1895).
61. E.g., Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 415 N.E.2d 181 (1981)
(complainant's previous arrests for prostitution under similar conditions were a motive
to falsely claim the defendant raped her); State v. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344
A.2d 446 (1975) (suspected pregnancy by boyfriend and fear of mother's anger was
possible motivation to accuse defendant of rape); State v. Salkil, 659 S.W.2d 330
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (previous incidents where complainant had affairs after an
argument with her husband claimed by defendant to be relevant in light of the fact
that complainant had an argument with her husband prior to the alleged rape); State
v. Jalo, 27 Or. App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976) (en banc) (complainant accused
defendant of rape because he threatened to tell her mother that he caught complainant
having sex with his son).
62. E.g., State v. Jones, 716 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (defendant
claimed that a previous sexual relationship with the complainant was relevant to
consent and to a motiv6 to falsify rape charges); State v. Foulk, 725 S.W.2d 56 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987) (accused claimed that previous consensual incestuous relationship with
his mother was relevant to consent); State v. Boyd, 643 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) (defendant claimed that all instances of sexual relationships with complainant
should be admissible); State v. Crisp, 629 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (defendant
claimed error in the exclusion of testimony about prior sexual activity with com-
plainant); see also United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 930 (1979) (rejected the argument that defendant should be allowed to
impeach complainant's credibility with specific prior conduct evidence; acknowledged
that evidence of specific prior sexual conduct between complainant and defendant
may be relevant).
63. E.g., State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 (1883); State v. White, 35 Mo. 500
(1865). See generally Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 4, at 546-51 (exploring the
reasoning behind the common law rule of admissibility).
64. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 4, at 549-50.
65. E.g., 3A J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE IN TRLAis AT COMMON LAW § 924a
(Chadbourn rev. 1970).
66. See supra note 59.
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Missouri followed the majority rule in not allowing evidence of specific
sexual conduct on the part of the complainant for the purpose of impeaching
her testimony. In 1865, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that the "char-
acter of the prosecutrix for chastity may be impeached, but this must be
done by general evidence of her reputation in that respect, and not by evi-
dence of particular instances of unchastity . .. '67 Missouri courts eventually
refused to allow reputation or opinion evidence of unchastity to be introduced
for impeachment purposes and restricted its use to that of proving consent.
68
Evidence of specific sexual conduct on the part of the complainant was
still admissible to prove or disprove a material fact or issue even though it
was not admissible to impeach. 69 In 1960, the Missouri Supreme Court re-
stricted this use of specific conduct evidence by holding that cross-exami-
nation of a rape complainant regarding specific prior sexual conduct with
persons other than the defendant in order to prove consent was no longer
admissible. 70 Evidence of prior consensual sex with the defendant was still
admissible on the issue of consent. 71
Missouri law immediately prior to the enactment of the rape shield
statute, then, was that prior sexual conduct evidence was only admissible
when it was relevant to a material issue such as consent. Only general rep-
utation or opinion evidence was admissible unless the defendant sought to
introduce evidence of prior consensual sex between himself and the com-
plainant.72
The constitutionality of prohibiting introduction of sexual conduct ev-
idence which the accused seeks to introduce in his defense depends upon the
relevancy of the evidence to a material fact or issue in the case. There is no
recognized constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence at trial .7 The
test for relevancy is a two-part test. First, the evidence must tend to prove
or disprove a material fact in issue in the case.74 Second, the probative value
of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for
prejudicial impact.75
There is little evidence to support the notion that unchastity is logically
relevant to the tendency to be untruthful. Support for such a view seemingly
67. White, 35 Mo. at 500-01. Contra State v. Patterson, 88 Mo. 88 (1895).
68. State v. Taylor, 320 Mo. 417, 8 S.W.2d 29 (1928).
69. E.g., State v. Lovitt, 243 Mo. 510, 147 S.W. 484 (1912).
70. State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1960).
71. State v. Northern, 472 S.W.2d 409, 410-11 (Mo. 1971) (dictum).
72. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
73. E.g., United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 930 (1979); State v. Harris, 620 S.W.2d 349 (Mo. 1981) (en banc); State v.
Thurber, 625 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Droste, 115 Wis. 2d 48, 339
N.W.2d 578 (1983); FED. R. Evm. 402 (irrelevant evidence is not admissible).
74. E.g., State v. Ray, 637 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. 1982) (en banc); State v. Mercer,
618 S.W.2d I (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981); FED. R. Evm. 401.
75. E.g., Ray, 637 S.W.2d 708; FED. R. Evm. 403.
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came from prevailing social attitudes regarding the impropriety of women
engaging in pre-marital and extra-marital sex.76 As evidence of the illogical
position taken by courts on this issue, there are many cases that stand for
the proposition that women could be impeached for unchastity while men
could not.77
If there is no logical relationship between sexual activity and the tendency
to be untruthful, there is no constitutional infirmity in completely prohibiting
the use of this type of evidence to impeach a witness. Indeed, many juris-
dictions have reached this conclusion by case law78 or by statutory construc-
tion. 79 Prohibiting the use of reputation evidence of prior sexual conduct and
evidence of specific conduct with third persons to impeach a rape complain-
ant's capacity for truthfulness serves the basic policy goal of not allowing
the outcome of a criminal prosecution to be influenced by irrelevant evi-
dence. 0 The defense strategy of injecting into a rape trial the distracting
collateral issue of a rape complainant's sexual activity, to thereby "put the
victim on trial," is eliminated as serving no legitimate purpose in this context.
Evidence of character to prove conduct consistent with that character is
generally inadmissible evidence." When such evidence is admissible, it is
usually limited to reputation and opinion evidence.12 The reasoning behind
this rule is twofold. First, the evidence tends to be given far too much weight
in relationship to its probative value. Second, character is a collateral issue
that may distract the jury from the central issues in controversy. 3
76. Tanford and Bocchino suggest that these attitudes stemmed from the view
that women were property which men sought to protect from "damage," i.e., loss
of virginity or chastity. The severe penalties for rape at common law reflected this
concern, and the severe penalties, in turn, led to the difficulty women experienced
in proving a rape charge. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 4, at 546 n.6. See generally
S. BROWN)MLLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (1975) (discussing social attitudes behind the
treatment of rape, rapists, and rape victims).
77. E.g., State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 531, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (1895) ("It is
a matter of common knowledge that the bad character of a man for chastity does
not even in the remotest degree affect his character for truth, when based upon that
alone, while it does that of a woman.").
78. E.g., United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 930 (1979); State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d
946 (1976) (en banc).
79. E.g., State v. Leslie, 14 Ohio App. 3d 343, 471 N.E.2d 503 (1984).
80. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. But see infra note 99.
81. E.g., FED. R. EvlD. 404; McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 188 (3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter McCoRMICK].
82. See cases cited supra note 59. But cf. cases cited supra note 62; FED. R.
EvlD. 405(a) (relevant specific instances of conduct may be inquired into on cross-
examination); FED. R. EviD. 405(b) (when character is an essential element of the
crime charged, evidence may be offered of specific instances of conduct).
83. MCCORMICK, supra note 81, § 188.
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Although a weak argument can be made for the logical relevancy of
opinion and reputation evidence of unchastity to the issue of consent,4 this
type of sexual conduct evidence fails the second part of the test for rele-
vancy.s5 Defense attorneys have long recognized the inflammatory nature of
such evidence and often sought to introduce reputation and opinion evidence
of unchastity to impeach the complainant under the guise of it being relevant
to a material issue in the case.16 Juries tend to give far too much weight to
such evidence in relationship to its very slight probative value, 7 and for this
reason, it is proper under the ordinary rules of evidence to exclude reputation
and opinion evidence of unchastity to prove consent. 8
Much of the above analysis applies with equal or greater force to the
use of evidence of specific instances of prior sexual conduct on the part of
the complainant to prove consent. 9 Specific conduct evidence of sexual ac-
84. The argument essentially is that once a person has consented to sexual
intercourse, he or she is more likely to consent again. The problem with this argument
is that there is no link from the previous acts of sexual intercourse to the specific
one in question. There is only a suggestion that the person is more likely to consent
to sex in general.
85. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., State v. McFarland, 604 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
(defendant's theory was that the complainant falsified rape charges because she feared
she was pregnant; court refused to admit evidence of complainant's sexual conduct
which occurred three months before the alleged rape because in the interim, com-
plainant experienced two menstrual cycles); see also cases collected in Ordover, Ad-
missibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Character
for Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. Rnv. 90, 114 n.136 (1977).
87. Tanford and Bocchino take issue with the interpretation given to a study
by Kalven and Zeisel. The study of cases tried in the 1950's when sexual conduct
evidence was admissible, showed that out of forty-two rape cases examined, there
were thirty-seven acquittals. The implication is that the conviction rate should be
similar to that of other violent crimes, and since prior sexual conduct evidence was
admissible at the time, the low conviction rate must be attributable to the use of such
evidence. Tanford and Bocchino point out that the cases examined were ones involving
forcible rape where victim and accused knew each other and the victim not injured.
They conclude that the study has been cited out of context and therefore does not
support the proposition that admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence will result
in a disproportionate number of acquittals. Tanford and Bocchino cite figures from
the study that show out of 64 aggravated rape cases, only 16 resulted in acquittal, a
lower acquittal rate than that of many other crimes. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note
4, at 572-74 nn.136-43 and accompanying text (citing H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE
AMERicAN JuRY (1966)). But cf. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUsTIcE, RAPE GUIDELINES
FoR A CoMMUNrrY RESPONSE 175 (1980) (of the cases studied by Kalven and Zeisel,
judges would have convicted in 22 cases, raising a possible issue of bias against rape
victims by jurors); J. MARsH, A. GEisT & N. CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE Lmarrs OF
LAW REFoRm 31, 83 (1982) (cited in Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional
Despite UnconstitutionalExclusions of Evidence, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1219, 1261 n.172.)
88. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
89. A description of a specific act will, in all likelihood, have a greater effect
on a jury because of the addition of detail to the testimony.
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tivity between the complainant and a third person may or may not be relevant
to a material issue, depending upon the facts of the case. Clearly, the mere
fact that a woman previously had sexual relations with a third person does
not have any real bearing upon whether she consented to sexual relations in
the situation in controversy. While at first glance, the argument that once a
woman has consented to sex with one man she is more likely to consent with
another may seem to carry some weight, the argument is less appealing on
closer examination. Even if one accepts the logic of the argument that the
evidence is relevant to consent, 90 the prejudicial effect of such evidence would,
in almost every circumstance, far outweigh its probative value. Under the
balancing portion of the two-part test for relevancy, then, the evidence would
be properly excluded.9'
On the other hand, a complete prohibition on evidence of specific prior
sexual conduct between the complainant and men other than the defendant
may deprive the defendant of the opportunity to present relevant exculpatory
evidence.9 2 Such evidence may be relevant to show a motive to falsify rape
charges. 93 For example, if the complainant was pregnant and wanted to hide
from her parents the fact that she had engaged in illicit consensual sex, she
may concoct a story of rape.9 4 The same may be true of a woman whose
90. See supra note 84.
91. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 112-28 and accompanying text. Ordover advocates a six-
prong test in determining whether to admit prior sexual conduct evidence as relevant
to the defense in a rape prosecution: (1) a clear showing that the complainant com-
mitted the prior acts; (2) "the circumstances of the prior acts closely resemble those
of the present case; (3) the prior acts are clearly relevant to a material issue such as
[consent];" (4) the evidence is necessary to the defense; (5) "the probative value of
the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effects;" and (6) only a pattern of similar
behavior (as opposed to a single incident) should be admissible. Ordover, supra note
86, at 113-14.
Relevant exculpatory evidence will usually be probative on the issue of consent.
Nonconsent is an element of the crime of rape. E.g., State v. Deckard, 426 S.W.2d
88 (Mo. 1968); State v. Patterson, 569 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 566.030(1) (Supp. 1987). The evidence may be probative on the issue of
identity. E.g., State v. Ervin, 723 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (defendant claimed
that evidence that indicated the victim may have had gonorrhea at the time of the
rape would tend to exonerate him since he did not contract the disease).
93. E.g., State v. Jalo, 27 Or. App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976) (en banc); see
also State v. Jones, 716 S.W.2d 799 (1986) (en banc); FED. R. EvrO. 404(b).
94. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 491.015(1)(2) (Supp. 1987) provides for this scenario
by permitting the admission of evidence to show an alternative source of pregnancy.
This is a common provision in rape shield laws. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-
407(l)(b) (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West Supp. 1986).
The more difficult question arises when the defendant alleges that the complain-
ant made false charges because she thought she was pregnant but subsequently turned
out not to be pregnant. E.g., State v. McFarland, 604 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980). Under the interpretation given to the Missouri statute in Jones, 716 S.W.2d
[Vol. 52
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husband or lover caught her in the act of having an affair. 9s Evidence of
prior sexual conduct with third persons may also be relevant to prove a plan
to extort money. If a prostitute and her customer disagreed over her price
or if the customer refused to pay her altogether, the prostitute may be mo-
tivated to accuse him of rape in order to get her price or to seek revenge
for his refusal to pay. 96 The accused may want to introduce evidence of a
similar pattern of conduct engaged in by the complainant which would nec-
essarily include evidence of her sexual behavior. For example, a woman may
have a history of filing false charges. 97 Similarly, she may have an emotional
problem that leads her to engage in truly indiscriminate sex and to later
accuse her lovers of rape because of a sense of guilt or self-loathing regarding
her actions. 98 In very limited circumstances, the evidence may be relevant for
56, Missouri courts will not admit this evidence since (I) the prosecutrix was not
really pregnant and (2) the alleged sexual activity was not between the defendant and
the complainant and the evidence therefore could not be admitted under Mo. REv.
STAT. § 491.015(1)(1) (Supp. 1987). The media have recently given a great deal of
coverage to the case of Gary Dotson wherein Cathy Webb recanted after Dotson
spent several years in prison for raping her. Webb claimed that fear of pregnancy
caused her to claim she was raped. See Rape and the Law, NEwswEEK, May 20,
1985, at 60.
95. E.g., State v. Salkil, 659 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (complainant
had history of having affairs after arguments with her husband). This type of evidence
may no longer be admissible in Missouri unless it falls within Mo. REv. STAT. §
491.015(1)(3) (Supp. 1987) (immediate surrounding circumstances of the alleged crime
are admissible). The sponsor of the rape shield statute in the Missouri State Senate,
Senator John Buechner stated that "this exception was intended to protect defendants
from false claims of rape by prostitutes and young women who had participated in
group sexual intercourse prior to the alleged rape." Comment, Rape Evidence Reform
in Missouri: A Remedy for the Adverse Impact of Evidentiary Rules on Rape Victims,
22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 367, 376 (1978). The Missouri Supreme Court has broadened
this interpretation slightly by comparing it to the concept of res gestae. State v.
Sherman, 637 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). However, the interpretation is
quite narrow. It may not apply, for example, if a rape complainant last had sexual
intercourse with her lover three weeks before the alleged rape. See infra text accom-
panying note 104 (discussion of consensual sexual activity with the defendant as
relevant to motive to falsify).
96. This evidence would not be relevant unless the defendant claimed consent
as a defense and unless the circumstances were similar to a prostitution transaction.
Cf. N.Y. Cium. PRoc. LAW § 60.42(2) (McKinney 1981) (any prostitution conviction
within 3 years of rape is admissible).
97. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255(9)(3)(c) (Supp. 1986) (past false
allegations of rape are admissible).
98. North Carolina is the only state to specify that psychiatric testimony
regarding the complainant's mental state is admissible. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1
R.412(b)(4) (1986). Other jurisdictions may admit the evidence under the rule of
relevance. Cf. J. WirMoau, supra note 65, § 924a ("No judge should ever let a sex
offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental
makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician.").
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impeachment purposes.9 Although evidence of this type of sexual behavior
may be prejudicial in the sense that it tends to be inflammatory and juries
tend to give it a great deal of weight, depending upon the facts of the case,
its probative value in exculpating the accused may be great. The weighing
process engaged in by a court in determining admissibility ought to be one
of probative value versus prejudice to the defendant or to the integrity of
the trial process itself, not one of probative value versus prejudice to the
witness.100
The relevancy of a rape complainant's prior consensual sexual relations
with the defendant is generally recognized by the courts and in the provisions
of the rape shield statutes themselves.' 10 Consensual sexual activity with the
accused is obviously not conclusive as to guilt or innocence, but such activity
may be highly probative on that issue.1 2 A woman who has previously con-
sented to sex with the defendant can be said to be at least somewhat likely
to have consented to sex with him again.' 0' The evidence may also be relevant
to some other issue such as a motive to falsify as was argued in Jones.""4
The Missouri rape shield statute limits the admissibility of evidence of
prior sexual conduct between the complainant and the defendant to that
which is "reasonably contemporaneous with the date of the alleged crime." 0
Rigid time limitations in this context do not make sense as a general rule.
Rather, what is reasonably contemporaneous ought to be decided from the
facts of the case."' 6 Acts of intercourse occurring over a long time frame are
not necessarily precluded from being consensual.
The Missouri Supreme Court, previous to its decision in Jones,' 7 rec-
ognized that evidence of prior sexual conduct between the complainant and
the defendant may be relevant to a material issue in the case despite its not
having occurred at a time "reasonably contemporaneous with the date of
99. If the state introduces evidence regarding the complainant's sexual history,
the defendant should be allowed to impeach the testimony with specific conduct
evidence. E.g., State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St. 3d 33, 487 N.E.2d 560 (1986) (after
complainant testified on direct examination that she was homosexual, evidence of
heterosexual sex held relevant to consent); State v. Lantz, 44 Or. App. 695, 607 P.2d
197 (1980) (en banc) (after complainant testified that she waited 3 days to report anal
rape because she was embarrassed, evidence that she had been a prostitute held
admissible td? contradict her claim of embarrassment).
100. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 802 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
101. E.g., Mo. Rv. STAT. § 491.015 (Supp. 1987). For the text of the statute,
see supra note 15.
102. See, e.g., State v. Foulk, 725 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
103. But cf. discussion, supra note 84.
104. 716 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
105. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 491.015(1)(1) (Supp. 1987). For text of statute, see
supra note 15.
106. See, e.g., Jones, 716 S.W.2d 799; Foulk, 725 S.W.2d 56.
107. Jones, 716 S.W.2d 799.
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the alleged crime."10 The court did so by interpreting subsection 2 of the
statute as a "catch-all" category for relevant evidence that did not otherwise
fit into the exceptions listed in the statute.' °9 Since the court has overruled
that interpretation of the law, it may need to reconsider its interpretation of
the term "reasonably contemporaneous. '" 110 Greater flexibility in applying
subsection 1(1) of the statute may be necessary in order to preserve the
defendant's right to a fair trial. In other words, the courts may need to
examine more closely what "reasonably contemporaneous" means as applied
to the facts of -individual cases rather than using strict time limitations in
defining the term.-
Assuming that relevant evidence is being excluded through the appli-
cation of the rape shield statute, it becomes necessary to determine the ap-
propriate standard of review to analyze the constitutionality of such an
exclusion. In 1965, the United States Supreme Court extended to state pro-
ceedings the sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine wit-
nesses.112 The Court said:
It cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of cross-
examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to
confront the witnesses against him. And probably no one, certainly no one
experienced in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value of cross-exami-
nation in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth in a criminal case.
The fact that this right appears in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights
reflects the belief of the Framers of those liberties and safeguards that
confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution .... There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court
and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions
of belief that the right of confrontation is an essential and fundamental
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional
goal."'
The Supreme Court has indicated that when a state law or evidentiary rule
conflicts with a criminal defendant's need to present relevant evidence, a
balancing of the state's interests in prohibiting the use of the evidence against
the defendant's need to present a complete defense must take place. In Davis
v. Alaska,1 1 4 a state law prohibited a criminal defendant from questioning a
108. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 491.015(l)(1) (Supp. 1987). For the text of the statute,
see supra note 15.
109. See supra text accompanying note 31.
110. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 491.015(1)(1) (Supp. 1987). For the text of the statute,
see supra note 15.
111. See, e.g., Jones, 716 S.W.2d 799; Foulk, 725 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987).
112. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (extending confrontation clause to
states via the fourteenth amendment).
113. Id. at 404-05.
114. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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prosecution witness regarding his being on probation for a juvenile offense.
The defendant wanted to impeach the witness for bias, his theory being that
the witness had an interest in testifying in a manner favorable to the state
so as not to endanger his probationary status."' The prosecution invoked a
state rule of procedure prohibiting the disclosure of a juvenile's record in a
non-juvenile court proceeding. 116 The trial court granted the prosecution's
request for a protective order prohibiting disclosure of the witness' juvenile
record." 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed Davis' convic-
tion on the grounds that the protective order violated Davis' sixth amendment
right to cross-examine witnesses:
We do not and need not challenge the State's interest as a matter of its own
policy in the administration of criminal justice to seek to preserve the an-
onymity of a juvenile offender. Here, however, petitioner sought to intro-
duce evidence of Green's probation for the purpose of suggesting that Green
was biased and, therefore, that his testimony was either not to be believed
in his identification of petitioner or at least very carefully considered in that
light. Serious damage to the strength of the State's case would have been a
real possibility had petitioner been allowed to pursue this line of inquiry.
In this setting we conclude that the right of confrontation is paramount to
the State's policy of protecting a juvenile offender. Whatever temporary
embarrassment might result to Green or his family by disclosure of hisjuvenile record-if the prosecution insisted on using him to make its case-
is outweighed by petitioner's right to probe into the influence of possible
bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness.'
The Court applied a similar analysis in Chambers v. Mississippi."9 Chambers
was a defendant in a murder prosecution who was prohibited by the state's
voucher rule 20 from cross-examining McDonald, a witness who had previ-
ously confessed to the murder and later repudiated his confession.' 2 ' Cham-
bers was also prohibited from presenting witnesses who had heard McDonald
confess to the shooting on the grounds that the testimony would be hearsay.I22
In reversing Chambers' conviction, the Court stated:
115. Id. at 311.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 319.
119. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
120. Chambers filed a motion requesting a court order compelling McDonald
to appear as a witness in the case, and in addition, asked for a ruling that Chambers
be allowed to examine McDonald as an adverse witness if the state did not call
McDonald. A ruling that McDonald was an adverse witness was necessary for Cham-
bers to impeach his testimony with McDonald's prior confession because Mississippi
adhered to the rule that one could not impeach his "own" witness. Id. at 291.
121. Id. at 288.
122. Id. at 293.
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The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. The
rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's
own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process.
Chambers was denied an opportunity to subject McDonald's damning
repudiation and alibi to cross-examination.... The right of cross-exami-
nation is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the
constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure the "accuracy of the
truth-determining process.".... Of course, the right to confront... is not
absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legiti-
mate interests in the criminal trial process. But its denial or significant
diminution calls into question the ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding
process" and requires that the competing interest be closely examined. 1 "
The Supreme Court still adheres to the balancing test articulated in Davis
and Chambers. In Crane v. Kentucky, 1- 4 a 1986 case, the Court reversed
Crane's conviction for murder and remanded the case for a new trial because
Crane was not allowed to introduce testimony regarding the circumstances
of his confession. The trial court granted the state's motion to exclude the
testimony because the judge had already ruled that the confession was vol-
untary.lu The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Crane's conviction, rea-
soning that state procedure prohibited relitigating a pretrial ruling on whether
a confession was voluntary. Since the evidence Crane sought to introduce
bore on the question of voluntariness, even though he wanted to introduce
it to dispute the credibility of the confession, 16 the court held there was no
error in disallowing the evidence.- 7 The Supreme Court disagreed with the
Kentucky court and held that under the circumstances of the case, the refusal
of the trial court to admit the evidence deprived Crane of a fair trial:
[S]tripped of the power to describe to the jury the circumstances that prompted
his confession, the defendant is effectively disabled from answering the one
question every rational juror needs answered: If the defendant is innocent,
why did he previously admit his guilt? ...
[The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportu-
nity to present a complete defense." ... That opportunity would be an
empty one if the state were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence
bearing on the credibility of a confession when such evidence is central to
the defendant's claim of innocence. In the absence of any valid state jus-
tification, exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant
123. Id. at 294-95 (citations omit6ted).
124. 106 S. Ct. 2142 (1986).
125. Id. at 2144.
126. The trial court ruled that Crane could inquire into the inconsistencies of
the confession, but could not introduce evidence regarding the duration of the in-
terrogation or the number of persons present. Id.
127. Crane v. Commonwealth, 690 S.W.2d 753, 754 (Ky. 1985).
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of the basic right to have the prosecution's case encounter and "survive the
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing."'1'
Although the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the consti-
tutionality of rape shield statutes, it has addressed a similar issue in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.29 In Globe, the Court balanced first
amendment rights against the privacy interests of rape victims. 130 Globe is of
interest because the Court used a balancing process similar to that articulated
in Davis and Chambers to declare unconstitutional a state law intended to
protect the privacy of minor rape victims in order to protect their emotional
well being and to encourage the reporting of rape to the police.131
The plaintiff newspaper company tried to gain access to a trial which
involved the rape of three minor girls. 132 The controversy went to the Supreme
Court where the Court stated that if "the State attempts to deny the right
of access in order in inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must
be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental in-
terest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."' 33
In striking down the statute, the Court noted that there was no evidence
that the type of protection given by the statute would result in increased
reporting of rape to the police."34 The Court then stated:
[E]ven if [the law] effectively advanced the State's interest, it is doubtful
that the interest would be sufficient to overcome the constitutional attack,
for that same interest could be relied on to support an array of mandatory
closure rules designed to encourage victims to come forward. Surely it cannot
be suggested that minor victims of sex crimes are the only crime victims
who, because of publicity attendant to criminal trials, are reluctant to come
forward and testify. The State's argument based on this interest therefore
proves too much.' 31
The Court also did not give much weight to the interest of the state in
protecting minor rape victims from the emotional distress of public trials. It
concluded that the decision of whether to close the trial to the public should
be made on a case by case basis taking into account several characteristics
of the victim such as age. 36
128. Crane, 106 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (citations omitted).
129. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
130. Id. at 598.
131. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981). The law provided
that in trials concerning sex crimes involving minors, the judge shall only admit to
the courtroom those having a "direct interest in the case."
132. Globe, 457 U.S. at 598.
133. Id. at 606-07.
134. Id. at 610.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 608-09.
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The factual situation in Globe is sufficiently analogous to the problem
presented in the application of rape shield statutes that the Supreme Court's
holding in Globe must be considered in analyzing the statutes. The Globe
holding indicates that the Supreme Court will not allow blanket infringements
on constitutional rights. Decisions must be made on a case by case basis,
and the state interest must be compelling to prevail over the constitutional
right that is infringed upon. Any infringement on a constitutional right must
be no broader than is necessary under the facts of the case.
Taking guidance from the Supreme Court's pronouncements on this
issue, it is clear that in analyzing the competing interests of the state and the
defendant, the state's interest in prohibiting the use of prior sexual conduct
evidence must substantially outweigh the defendant's right to present evidence
in his own defense. At the beginning of this Note, the policy interests behind
rape shield laws were identified as (1) encouraging rape victims to report the
crime, (2) eliminating the use of irrelevant evidence to impeach rape com-
plainants, and (3) ending harassment of the complainant by the defense. 137
In order to constitutionally prohibit otherwise admissible evidence central to
the defense, these policies must be of such paramount importance to the
state that they overshadow the rights of the defendant.
Rape is a serious crime138 and, according to the United States Department
of Justice, it is one of the most under-reported crimes. 13 9 The state certainly
has a compelling interest in encouraging the victims of a violent crime to
report and prosecute the crime, particularly when there is a history of sub-
stantial under-reporting.1 4 Rape shield laws are a rational response to the
reluctance of rape victims to report the crime to law enforcement authori-
ties. 14' Rape shield laws also serve the policy goals of preventing harassment
137. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
138. Rape is classified as a violent crime by the United States Department of
Justice. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE
(1983) [hereinafter REPORT].
139. A 1983 study by the Department of Justice indicated that 42% of all rapes
went unreported in 1981. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SoURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1983 (1984). A 1977 report indicated a much higher percentage
of unreported rapes, estimating 3.5 to 9 times more rapes occur than are reported.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FBI Uurnoimu CRIME REPORTS, 1977, at 14 (1978).
140. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
141. It is difficult to single out any one factor which has resulted in the in-
creased reporting of rape. The government, in its surveys of crime victims, does not
include fear of harassment by defense attorneys as a possible factor in not reporting
rape to the police. About 21% of survey respondents report that the rape was too
personal a matter to report to police. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VIC-
TIMIZATION IN THE UNrrED STATES, 1983, at 99 (1985); cf. REPORT, supra note 138,
at 6 ("It is widely believed by analysts that the rise in the number of rapes reported
to police stems largely from the special programs established by many police de-
partments to treat victims of rape more sympathetically.").
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of the complainant and of preventing the introduction of irrelevant evi-
dence. 4 2
In so far as the shield laws prohibit the use of irrelevant evidence, there
is no constitutional problem because there is no constitutional right to present
irrelevant evidence. 143 The state's interest in this context far outweighs that
of the defendant because (1) the defendant's interest does not even rise to
the level of a legitimate interest and (2) there is a definite, well-recognized
public policy of preventing the outcomes of trials from being decided on an
irrational basis.'"
Balancing the exclusion of relevant exculpatory evidence against the state
interests enumerated above must be done on a case by case basis. 45 In a
certain factual situation, the probative value of the evidence may be so slight
that there would be no substantial harm to the defendant's case in excluding
it.146 In other situations, the evidence may be so compelling that its admission
is required no matter how strong the countervailing interest. 47 The availa-
bility of other exculpatory evidence to the defendant may enter into the
analysis . 48 If the legislature and courts issue a blanket prohibition on sexual
conduct evidence, and in a specific case, the probative value of such evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect, the prohibition would violate the defendant's
sixth amendment rights. 49
The case of State v. Jones'50 is similar to Chambers v. Mississippi,5'
Davis v. Alaska,12 and Crane v. Kentucky' 53 in that the defendant was pre-
cluded, through the application of a state procedural rule, from presenting
142. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The in camera hearing may be
the most useful feature of the shield laws in that it prevents jurors from hearing
sexual conduct evidence before the relevancy of the evidence is ruled upon. There is,
therefore, less chance of a verdict tainted by irrelevant evidence.
143. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
144. See cases cited supra note 73.
145. See supra text accompanying note 136.
146. See sources cited supra notes 74-75.
147. E.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 2142 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Cham-
bers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
148. See, e.g., Davis, 415 U.S. 308; Chambers, 410 U.S. 284.
149. These rights include the right to compulsory process extended to state
proceedings in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). See generally Westen, Con-frontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal
Cases, 91 Hv. L. Ruv. 567 (1978). Because problems arising from the application
of rape shield statutes usually arise in the context of cross-examination, discussion
in this Note has centered upon the right to cross-examine witnesses. The constitutional
analysis applies equally to compulsory process.
150. 716 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
151. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
152. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
153. 106 S. Ct. 2142 (1986).
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his strongest (and perhaps only) defense argument. The dissent in Jones
correctly pointed out that the case involved little more than a "swearing
match" between the complainant and defendant. 5 4 In a close case such as
Jones, the defendant's interest in presenting relevant, highly probative ex-
culpatory evidence must outweigh the state's interest in prohibiting use of
the evidence. Otherwise, the trial process comes dangerously close to being
nothing more than trial by affidavit.
The Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation in State v. Jones of the
rape shield statute invites unconstitutional applications of the law by Missouri
courts. 5 5 The court's application of the law to the facts of Jones has resulted
in a violation of Jones' sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. 5 6
Since the court is no longer willing to follow the more acceptable in-
terpretation it gave to the rape shield statute in State v. Brown, 57 it should,
at the very least, interpret the term "reasonably contemporaneous" in a
manner that would allow introduction of relevant evidence that does not fall
within the time limits delineated in State v. Crisp58 and State v. Boyd.5 9 To
do otherwise is to do nothing less than to violate the constitutional rights of
defendants in criminal proceedings.
MERRY C. EvANs
154. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 803 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
157. 636 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1212 (1983).
158. 629 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). Although the court indicated it
could not rely on "judicial review by the use of clocks or calendars," in light of its
holding in Jones, it seems reluctant to interpret the term "reasonably contempora-
neous" in a more flexible manner. Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 801; see also State v. Foulk,
725 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
159. 643 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see supra note 158.
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